India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

From Nationalism to Factionalism: Faultlines in the Naga Insurgency

Do ceasefires or peace talks create fragmentation in the insurgent groups? Rather than proposing claims that can offer predictions about armed groups behaviour under ceasefires or peace processes, the analysts tend to focus largely on the dynamics between state and non-state actor. The experts pay little attention to overtime changes in social and local political context which might contribute to propelling a rebel group towards fragmentation and factionalism. The present study intends to fill this gap by exploring the shifting role of public opinion and ethnic support for the peace talks to ascertain whether it can increase the likelihood of factionalism in rebel groups or not. This article applies this approach to the case of Naga National Movement (1947–2015) in India, and finds that the proposed variable appears to have increased the frequency of factionalism in the movement.     

Explaining Cohesion in an Insurgent Organization: The Case of the Mizo National Front

Despite the prevalence of violent uprisings against the states, existing literature has produced a generalized explanation of the causes and onset of such uprisings ignoring crucial aspects of (non-state) armed group cohesion, such as their capabilities to manage intra-group tensions and rivalries. In this paper, I examine recent research in the field of civil conflict to understand the importance of investigating underlying constraints which can cause serious impediments to the capabilities of a state during the course of a war. The paper then focuses on the importance of internal strategic resources, such as pre-war and wartime sociopolitical networks in which insurgents mobilize, recruit new cadres and maintain intra-group cooperation, to suggest how it can contain the consequences of counterinsurgency operations and other state strategies on the internal cohesion of an insurgent group. A detailed case study of the Mizo National Front (MNF) in India demonstrates the argument’s plausibility.     

Escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India

Insurgencies in the Northeast of India have been a recurring phenomenon since India's independence in 1947. One of the most significant aspects of the multiple insurgencies has been the use of violence for political goals. By drawing upon three cases of insurgencies in Northeast India, the article offers a conceptual framework on escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies. The article argues that the most critical variables which have a direct bearing on the levels of insurgent violence are: popular support, loss of legitimacy and the state's counter-response.     

The nexus between military expenditures and economic growth in the BRICS and the US: an empirical note

This empirical note re-examines the causal linkages between military expenditures and economic growth for the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and that for the USA during the period 1988–2012. Results of Granger causality tests show that military expenditures influence economic growth in the USA, economic growth influences military expenditures in both Brazil and India, a feedback between military expenditures and economic growth in Russia, and no causal relation exists between military expenditures and economic growth in China and South Africa. The findings of this study can provide important policy implications for the BRICS countries and also for the USA.